The dark and the bright side of power: implications for the management of business-to-business relationships

Agricultural and Food Economics

Table 3 Results of the assessment of structural model

Hypotheses	Effects of latent variables	t-statistics	Beta (path) coefficients (b)	Correlation coefficient (r)	b r
H1a	CP → COOR	3.142365	−0.276474	−0.181373	0.050
H1b	CP → COOP	3.211364	−0.291692	−0.249700	0.073
H2a	RWP → COOR	0.172568	0.016637	0.231527	0.004
H2b	RWP → COOP	1.476850	−0.193422	0.085145	−0.016
H3a	EP → COOR	3.836822	0.372217	0.419556	0.156
H3b	EP → COOP	2.418828	0.292702	0.375932	0.110
H4a	IP → COOR	0.130923	0.014832	0.271215	0.004
H4b	IP → COOP	2.736924	0.257051	0.372067	0.096
H5a	LP → COOR	0.078643	0.007748	−0.248269	−0.002
H5b	LP → COOP	1.037731	−0.107228	−0.306813	0.033
H6a	RFP → COOR	2.910312	0.257730	0.360260	0.093
H6b	RFP → COOP	1.588292	0.145881	0.257241	0.038

Source: own calculations
Abbreviations: COOR coordination, COOP cooperation, CP coercive power, RWP reward power, EP expert power, IP informational power, LP legitimate power, RFP referent power