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Fig. 2 | Agricultural and Food Economics

Fig. 2

From: Interaction between buyer power in agricultural procurement and seller power in food retailing, and optimal allocation of anti-trust efforts

Fig. 2

The increase (Δδr) in retailers’ profit margin due to the weakened buyer power in agricultural procurement under various levels of seller power in retail markets. Note: Δδr is the increase in retailers’ profit margin when processors’ buyer power is weakened from M = 2 to M = 3. The increase (Δδr) is larger when retailers have stronger seller power in retail markets. Case 1 is when there is a competitive wholesale market. Case 2 is when there is an oligopoly wholesale market. Case 3 is when there is an oligopsony wholesale market. Retailers’ profit margin increase in case 2 (red line) is larger than that in case 1 (blue line). The relative magnitudes between retailers’ profit margin increase in case 3 and those in cases 1 and 2 depend on various market factors so that all (in)equalities between them are possible

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