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Fig. 3 | Agricultural and Food Economics

Fig. 3

From: Interaction between buyer power in agricultural procurement and seller power in food retailing, and optimal allocation of anti-trust efforts

Fig. 3

Retail price decrease (ΔPr) due to the weakened seller power in food retailing under various levels of buyer power in farm markets. Note: ΔPr is the decrease in retail price when retailers’ seller power is weakened from N = 2 to N = 3. The magnitude of decrease (|ΔPr|) is smaller when the processors have stronger buyer power in farm markets. Case 1 is when there is a competitive wholesale market. Case 2 is when there is an oligopoly wholesale market. Case 3 is when there is an oligopsony wholesale market. Retail price decrease (|ΔPr|) in case 3 (green line) is larger than that in case 1 (blue line). The relative magnitudes between retail price decrease in case 2 and those in cases 1 and 3 depend on various market factors so that all (in)equalities between them are possible

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