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Fig. 4 | Agricultural and Food Economics

Fig. 4

From: Interaction between buyer power in agricultural procurement and seller power in food retailing, and optimal allocation of anti-trust efforts

Fig. 4

The increase (Δδw) in processors’ profit margin due to the weakened seller power in retail markets under various levels of buyer power in agricultural procurement. Note: Δδw is the increase in processors’ profit margin when retailers’ seller power is weakened from N = 2 to N = 3. The increase (Δδw) is larger when the processors have stronger buyer power in farm markets. Case 1 is when there is a competitive wholesale market. Case 2 is when there is an oligopoly wholesale market. Case 3 is when there is an oligopsony wholesale market. Processors’ profit margin increase in case 3 (green line) is larger than that in case 1 (blue line). The relative magnitudes between processors’ profit margin increase in case 2 and those in cases 1 and 3 depend on various market factors so that all (in)equalities between them are possible

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