Skip to main content


Springer Nature is making Coronavirus research free. View research | View latest news | Sign up for updates

Fig. 5 | Agricultural and Food Economics

Fig. 5

From: Interaction between buyer power in agricultural procurement and seller power in food retailing, and optimal allocation of anti-trust efforts

Fig. 5

Farm price increase (ΔPf) in two scenarios of anti-trust methods under various wholesale market structures. Note: The red lines represent the farm price increase (ΔPf) when only processors’ buyer power is weakened (from M = 2 to M = 3). The blue lines represent the farm price increase (ΔPf) when both processors’ buyer power (from M = 2 to M = 3) and retailers’ seller power are weakened (from N = 2 to N = 3). The farm price increases (blue lines) are larger when the two forms of market power are jointly addressed

Back to article page