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Agricultural and Food Economics
Fig. 6 | Agricultural and Food Economics

Fig. 6

From: Interaction between buyer power in agricultural procurement and seller power in food retailing, and optimal allocation of anti-trust efforts

Fig. 6

Retail price decrease (ΔPr) in two scenarios of anti-trust methods under various wholesale market structures. Note: The red lines represent the retail price decrease (ΔPr) when only retailers’ seller power is weakened (from N = 2 to N = 3). The blue lines represent the retail price decrease (ΔPr) when both retailers’ seller power (from N = 2 to N = 3) and processors’ buyer power (from M = 2 to M = 3) are weakened. The retail price decreases |ΔPr| (blue lines) are larger when the two forms of market power are jointly addressed

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