Skip to main content

Advertisement

Springer Nature is making Coronavirus research free. View research | View latest news | Sign up for updates

Table 1 The impact of various wholesale market structures on farm and retail price and processors’ and retailers’ profit

From: Interaction between buyer power in agricultural procurement and seller power in food retailing, and optimal allocation of anti-trust efforts

  Impact of wholesale market structures
Farm price increase (∂Pf/∂M) ∂Pf, OP/∂M > ∂Pf, CM/∂M
Retail price decrease (|∂Pr/∂N|) |∂Pr, OS/∂N| > |∂Pr, CM/∂N|
Processors’ profit margin increase (∂δw/∂N) ∂δw, OS/∂N > ∂δw, CM/∂N
Retailers’ profit margin increase (∂δr/∂M) ∂δr, OP/∂M > ∂δr, CM/∂M
Farm price (Pf) Pf, OP < Pf, CM, Pf, OS < Pf, CM, Pf, OPPf, OS
Retail price (Pr) Pr, OP > Pr, CM, Pr, OS > Pr, CM, Pr, OPPr, OS
Processors’ profit margin (δw) δw, OP > δw, CM > δw, OS
Retailers’ profit margin (δr) δr, OP < δr, CM < δr, OS
  1. Subscripts “CM,” “OP,” and “OS” denote competitive, oligopoly, and oligopsony wholesale market, respectively. “” indicates that the relative magnitudes depend on various market factors so that all (in)equalities between the two prices/profit margins are possible